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However, I came across this interesting piece by Henry Blodget, referenced on Jim Sinclair's website.
What Mr. Blodget points out very succinctly is that the next stage of taxpayer-funded government bailouts of the financial industry will be a great boon to the banks - if you are concerned about the real value of their assets, as Mr. Geithner is.
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What is the next layer of fantasy to be uncovered?
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Under the new Geithner plan, the banks could now be forced - through stress testing or through regulatory compulsion - to begin marking these "hold to maturity" assets at their real market value - that is - at values much lower than those now on the books.
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When the banks tell us that their books are sound, it is this next layer of fantasy on which these seemingly reassuring statements are made.
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The implication?
According to Mr. Blodget, there is "one small problem with Geithner's plan - it will bankrupt the banks!"
The following chart (see Mr. Blodget's article below) illustrates clearly the historically unprecedented debt levels of US consumers at present. Why is this important? The chart reaffirms that we are presently dealing with a debt crisis, not a liquidity crisis:
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For the avid reader - additional links on the PPIP (Public-Private Investment Partnership):
- Dr. Housing Bubble.
- Finance Trends Matter.
- Geithner's Five Big Misconceptions (Blodget).
- Table summarizing high levels at which banks mark their toxic assets (when permissible).
- The "Ridiculous Marks" of Toxic Assets.
Laurence,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the mention (of the Finance Trends reading list) and for highlighting that Clusterstock article in your post.
I think your comments and the Blodget piece really help to boil this difficult topic down to one important theme: the difference between a market determined price vs. bank model value for many of these "toxic assets".
I am certainly relying upon the analysis of others more authoritative than I, but it seems that the simple issue is that a facade is being dismantled layer by layer. The mutually agreed pretense was that the banks were earning ever greater profits by loaning money to third parties ever less likely to repay them. The fantasized profits allowed senior staff to award themselves ever more exorbitant bonuses for probably two decades. What a shell game, but how self-defeating! If you like, a Ponzi scheme in which the last players don't have to pay anything! Ever so human and ever so simple....
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